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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
UNDER §170 DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
Wedlock, as old men note, hath likened been
Unto a public crowd or common rout,
Where those that are without would fain get in
And those that are within would fain get out.
-Poor Richard's Almanack
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first general divorce law in the State of New York was enacted in
1787, providing for judicial divorce on the grounds of adultery.' For nearly
two centuries, adultery remained the sole ground for divorce in New York.
Under new section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law, which took effect on
September 1, 1967, New York has five grounds for divorce in addition to
adultery: 2 cruelty; abandonment; imprisonment; judicial separation for two
years; and separation pursuant to a written agreement for two years.
Now the New York courts are faced with the task of interpreting the new
law. One of the many problems to be dealt with is whether the new grounds
may be applied where a cause of action, such as cruelty or abandonment, took
place prior to September 1, 1967. The purpose of this note is to explore the
influences and alternatives which the courts must take into consideration in
construing section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS TO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

OF TME NEw GROUNDS

There is no doubt that marriage is a civil contract, and yet it is more.
It is a status, or institution, in which the state has a fundamental interest. 4 The
question arises, therefore, as to how the state can control and regulate the
marriage and its parties without violating the federal constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contract. 5 In the case of Hunt v. Hunt,6 it was stated:
1. H. Foster & D. Freed, Law and the Family § 6:2 (1966).
2. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (Supp. 1967). The new grounds for divorce are: cruelty;
abandonment for two or more years; imprisonment for more than three years; separation

pursuant to a judicial separation for two years; and separation pursuant to written separation
agreement for two years.
3. Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 2 N.E.2d 815 (1936); Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y.
313, 165 N.E. 460 (1929) ; Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 220 N.Y.S.2d (Sup Ct. 1961) ;
Lorfice v. Lorfice, 148 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Dorgeloh v. Murtha, 92 Misc. 279,
156 N.Y.S. 181 (Sup. Ct. 1915).

4.
287, 7
1947).
5.
6.

Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936); Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc.
N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Q'Conner v. Jackson, 74 F. Supp. 370 (W.D.N.Y.
(The power to regulate marriages is one retained by the states.).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
131 U.S. Append. clxv, 24 L. Ed. 1109 (1879).
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In the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 629, 4 L. Ed. 629, it was
expressly said by Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of
the court, that the provision of the Constitution prohibiting States
from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts "had never
been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect
property or some object of value, and confer rights which may be
asserted in a court of justice." It never has been understood to restrict
the general right of the Legislature to legislate upon the subject of
divorces. Those Acts enable some tribunal not to impair a marriage
contract, but to liberate one of the parties because it has been broken
by the other.. .. 7
Thus, initially the Court reasoned that since the marriage contract conferred no property rights, nor rights which may be asserted in a court of
justice, dissolution of the contract would not be impairment in the constitutional sense. However, in Maynard v. Hill s the Court did not attempt to
distinguish the type of contract involved in marriage, but substituted a different
standard in its place:
[M]arriage is an institution of society, creating a status which may be
regulated and controlled by public law; that legislation affecting the
institution or annulling the relation between the parties is not within
the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States against impairment of contracts. .... 9
This later and still recognized view, that marriage is a status, controls as
to questions of federal constitutionality of divorce legislation.' 0
Under New York law, marriage is a "civil contract"' for purposes of
solemnization, and in that sense is purely statutory.' 2 However, New York, like
the majority of states, considers marriage a status or institution, 13 and thus
legislation concerning marriage is not affected by the New York constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contract.1 4
If legislation concerning marriage is not constitutionally prohibited as an
impairment of contract, what of retroactive application of divorce legislation?
Since a divorce statute is not penal in nature, retroactive application will not
7.
8.

24 L. Ed. at 1110.
125 U.S. 190 (1888).

9. Id. at 214. (Emphasis added.)
10. See H. Foster & D. Freed, supra note 1, at § 1:2; 1 J. Bishop, Marriage, Divorce
and Separation § 1480 (1891). See also Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
269 (1935); Home Bldg. Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 298 (1934); Baker v. Kilgore,
145 U.S. 487 (1892); Tipping v. Tipping, 82 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Meister v. Moore,
96 U.S. 76 (1878).
11. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10 (1964). See also cases cited in supra note 3.
12. Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557 (N.Y. 1825); Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige 108

(N.Y. 1830).

13. Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E. 815 (1936); Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc.
287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1938).

14. Contra, Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 380, 34 Am. Dec. 165 (1839); Greenlaw v.
Greenlaw, 12 N.H. 200 (1837). Accord, Cavanaugh v. Valentine, 181 Misc. 48, 41 N.Y.S.2d
896 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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be subject to ex post facto constitutional prohibitions.'" Further, there is
no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, since
marriage is purely a domestic relationship where there are no vested property
rights involved. 16
III. THE HiSTORY OF ADULTERY AS A GROUND FOR DIvORci IN NEW Youc
Adultery had been the sole ground for divorce in New York from 1787
to 1967. Until 1879 the guilty party in a divorce action was forbidden to
remarry, but the law was then relaxed so as to permit remarriage if the court
modified the decree. 17 Despite changing social conditions, New York was
adamant in returning adultery as its sole ground for divorce.' 8 As a result, a
strange development took place concerning the termination of the marital
relationship. The function served by additional grounds for divorce in other
jurisdictions was partially achieved by different modes in New York. For
example, New York courts indirectly encouraged migratory divorces by a
reluctance to permit collateral attacks upon New Yorkers' migratory divorce
decrees.' Also, the ease with which one could obtain an annulment, especially
on the ground of fraud, 20 made this procedure a much used2 ' "substitute"
ground for divorce in New York. In addition, "since over ninety percent of
New York divorces are uncontested and are usually heard by referees, there
is no ironclad assurance that New York divorces in fact rest upon a real, as
distinguished from a simulated or imaginary, adultery." 22 Thus, in the past
courts liberally enforced the rules governing annulment and separation to
offset the inequities of a single ground divorce rule.23 This further produced
an attitude that where the marriage was no longer viable, and conciliation was
impossible, most judges have been disposed to grant whatever remedy was
available to facilitate the termination of the de jure marital status where such
24
status no longer existed de facto.
15. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Leon v. Torruella, 99 F.2d 851 (1st Cir.
1938); Tipping v. Tipping, 82 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1936).

16. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311 (1911).
17. [18791 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 321.
18. See N. Blake, The Road to Reno ch. 6 (1962); P. Jacobson, American Marriage
and Divorce 112-18 (1959).
19. See, e.g., Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
20. See Note, Annulments for Fraud-New Yorlk's Answer to Reno? 48 Colum. L.
Rev. 900 (1948). See also P. Jacobson, supra note 18, at 115; Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev.
621 (1952) (corroboration in divorce and annulment proceedings).
21. According to P. Jacobson, supra note 18, at 113-14, New York annually accounts
for one-third to one-half of all annulments in the United States and in at least ten counties
annulments annually exceed divorces.
22. H. Foster & D. Freed, supra note 1, at § 6:1, citing P. Jacobson, supra note 18,
at 115-16, where it is related that in 1948 the New York City District Attorney smashed
a "divorce ring" of professional co-respondents and hundreds of uncontested cases were
removed from the supreme court calendar at the request of counsel. In all, the number of
decrees dropped by one-third in New York City in 1948. See also Note, Collusive and
Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 1121 (1936).
23. See supra notes 17-20.
24. Interview with William Lawless, Justice, Sup. C., 8th Jud. Dist., Nov., 1967.
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It may be concluded that the courts of the State have tried to stay in tune
with changing social patterns concerning divorce by offsetting a one-ground
rule with a liberal, and even permissive, interpretation of the law pertaining
25
to separation, annulment, and uncontested divorce actions. This may result
in a similar liberal or permissive attitude in the courts when the question of
interpretation of the new divorce grounds, as to retroactivity, comes before
20
them.

IV.

INTERPRETATION OF NEw YoRiK DOMMSTIc RELATIONS LAW,
SECTION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY

A. Divorce Is Purely Statutory in New York
The New York courts have consistently held that divorce law is purely
statutory,27 as opposed to a common law action. However, even though the
power of the courts in a divorce action is confined to the exercise of express
powers conferred by statute, application of the statute requires the exercise of
such incidental powers as are commensurate with the full exercise of relief
29
prayed for.28 The divorce action takes place before a court of equity, with the
result that the court is bound by the express powers enumerated in the statute,
and its exercise of incidental powers will be within its equitable discretion. This
does not mean, however, that a court's equity powers may be invoked to change
statutory requirements and procedure.30 The distinction is that it is the statute
which controls the equity allowed, not the equity which controls the interpretation of the statute. In other words, a court in interpreting section 170 will be
bound by the cannons of construction to construe its express powers, and then
will exercise its equitable powers to administer those express powers.
B. Canons of Construction
Generally, statutes are to be construed as prospective only, except where
31
the statute deals with procedure or remedy as opposed to substantive rights
However, no retroactive effect may be attributed to a statute granting a new
remedy where no remedy existed before, in the absence of express words or
3 2
necessary implication requiring such interpretation. This gives rise to three
25. The power to grant divorces was transferred from the legislature to the Court of

Chancery by [1787] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 69; See also Moot v. Moot, 214 N.Y. 204, 108
N.E. 424 (1915).
26. H. Foster & D. Freed, supra note 1, at § 6:1.
27. Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 556 (N.Y. 1825); Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige 108
(N.Y. 1830); Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77 (1898).
28. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 93 N.E. 192 (1910); Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach, 96 N.Y. 456 (1884).
29. See supra note 25.
30. Powell v. Powell, 282 App. Div. 99, 122 N.Y.S.2d 281 (4th Dep't 1953).
31. Micamold Radio Corp. v. Beedie, 156 Misc. 390, 282 N.Y.S. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Hollenback v. Born, 238 N.Y. 34, 143 N.E. 782 (1924).
32. Western New York & Pa. Ry. v. City of Buffalo, 176 Misc. 350, 27 N.Y.S.2d 249
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
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questions: (1) Does the express wording of section 170 indicate retroactive application? (2) What method of discovery is used to find a necessary implication
requiring retroactive application? (3) Does section 170 grant new remedies
where none existed before?
1. The Wording of the Statute
Section 170, New York Domestic Relations Law, reads: "Action for
divorce. An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage. . . . The
words may be would seem to indicate "prospective only" intent in the application of the new grounds. In an early New York case, 4 where a new section had
been added to the statute providing for limited divorces extending the right
to cases in which it had not theretofore existed, it was stated:
In order to give her the benefit of the remedy which the bill seeks, the
revised statutes, as applicable to her case, must be construed to have a
retrospective effect. It is a rule however, never to apply a statute
retrospectively by mere construction. If its terms are such as clearly
to indicate that the Legislature intended it should operate upon and
apply to past transactions of a civil nature, then the courts may permit it to so apply. . . But, if a statute is silent in its terms or at all
ambiguous in relation to its effect and application to past events,
courts of justice are bound not to apply to any other than to those
which have arisen since the law took effect and are not at liberty to
consider it other than as a prospective
law operating prospectively
35
upon the affairs and conduct of men.
Thus, section 170 would appear to allow only prospective application. Simply
on the basis of statutory construction there are cases in other states which both
uphold and contest this reasoning. In Barrington v. Barrington,0 the Supreme
Court of Alabama held a divorce statute prospective only since to hold the
opposite would "give new legal effect to conduct or conditions occurring or
existing prior to its enactment, thereby imposing upon any person unanticipated
disabilities or alterations of legal status, [which] is retrospective in a sense
odious to the law."137 The language found to be prospective only read: "when
the wife without support from him has lived separate and apart from bed and
33. Emphasis supplied. The language of §§ 170(5), (6) has been purposely omitted
since these subsections are retroactive by virtue of [1966] N.Y. Sess. laws ch. 254, § 15 and
any implications of that provision will be discussed in the text accompanying infra notes
83-95. [1966] id. provides: "This act shall take effect September first, nineteen hundred
sixty-seven provided that the two year period specified in subdivisions five and six of section
one hundred seventy . . . shall not be computed to include any period prior to September
first nineteen hundred sixty-six. ...
1
34. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 3 Edw. Ch. 462 (N.Y. 1841).
35. Id. at 464.
36. 200 Ala. 315, 76 So. 81 (1917). (A strong dissent and three concurring opinions
make this case a valuable summary of the law involved in retroactivity and divorce in
general.)
37. Id. at 316, 76 So. at 82.
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board of the husband for five years next preceding the filing of the bill ....
3
It was further stated that no statute, including the instant one, could be granted
retroactive application since the legislative intent is neither clearly expressed
nor unequivocally implied. In Pierce v. Pierce,39 the court held that the language: "Divorces may be granted . . . (8) Where the parties are estranged
and have lived separate and apart for eight years or more... ,,40 on its face, does
not relate back and therefore can not be granted retroactive application. There
are other cases that have held similar statutes to be prospective on the basis of
an interpretation of the language alone. 4 1 Section 170 would seem to fall within

the same category with those prospective only cases.
In the case of Schuster v. Schuster,42 the court held the language: "When
for any reason the husband and wife have not lived or cohabited together as
husband and wife for a period of five years or more,"' 43 was a clear indication
of retroactive intent since the present perfect tense was used. There are other
cases where the use of the present perfect tense has been construed as a clear
indication that retroactive application was intended. 44 Retroactive intent was
found in Jones v. Jones,45 where the statute read "If any person hath been or
shall be injured in any of the above ways [indicating divorce grounds] mentioned. .... ,,4
There are many other cases holding divorce statutes retroactive, but not
on the basis of language alone. 47 In Dowie v. Becker, 48 the theory was utilized:
The act is remedial in its nature, and it took effect upon people as it
found them. It is simply retroactive to this extent: That it affected
the rights of persons already in existence from the passage of the act
38. Id.
39. 107 Wash. 125, 181 P. 24 (1919).
40. Id. at 127, 181 P. at 26.
41. See, e.g., McCraney v. McCraney, S Iowa 232, 68 Am. Dec. 702 (1857); Scott v.
Scott, 6 Ohio 534 (1884) ; Buckholts v. Buc'kholts, 24 Ga. 238 (1858); Shelburn v. Shelburn,
6 Me. 210 (1829); Tufts v. Tufts, 8 Utah 142, 30 P. 309 (1892); Burt v. Burt, 168 Mass.
204, 46 N.E. 622 (1897); Giles v. Giles, 22 Minn. 348 (1876).
42. 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933).
43. Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 599 (1933). (Emphasis supplied.)
44. See, e.g., Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965); State v. First Jud.
Dist. Ct., 53 Nev. 386, 2 P.2d 129 (1931). See also Cole v. Cole, 27 Wis. 531 (1869);
Phillips v. Phillips, 22 Wis. 256 (1867) (The Statute began, "Whenever the husband and
wife shall have voluntarily lived . .. " which led the court to say in both cases, that the
use of "whenever" dearly indicates any point in time including that prior to the enactment
of the statute.) (Emphasis supplied:)
45. 2 Overt. 2, 5 Am. Dec. 645 (Tenn. 1804).
46. Id. at 5, 5 Am. Dec. at 646 (Emphsis supplied.).
47. Tipping v. Tipping, 82 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho
143, 140 P. 965 (1914); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933); Dowie v.
Becker, 149 La. 159, 88 So. 777 (1921; Hava v. Chavigny, 143 La. 365, 78 So. 594 (1918) ;
Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1918); Vincent v. LeDoux, 146 La. 160, 83 So.
439 (1919); McCubbin v. McCubbin, 163 La. 20, 111 So. 481 (1927); Campbell v. Campbell,
174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938); Gertes v. Gertes, 196 Minn. 599, 265 N.W. 811 (1936);
George v. George, 41 P.2d 1059 (Nev. 1935) ; Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, S.E. 85 (1934) ;
McKenna v. McKenna, 53 R.I. 373, 166 A. 822 (1933); Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744,
139 S.E.2d 825 (1965); Todd v. Todd, 202 Va. 153, 115 S.E.2d 905 (1960).
48. 149 La. 159, 88 So. 777 (1921).
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and was not confined merely to rights and persons coming under its
terms in the future. It is a statute giving the personal status of
married persons, and giving the remedy to49 those who have lived
separate and apart for more than seven years.
2. Method of Discovery Used in Finding the Necessary Implication of Retroactive Intent.
A court must find either specific language or necessary implication that
the legislature intended a statute to be retroactive. Since the majority of cases
holding statutes retroactive do not do so on the basis of language alone, they
must be decided as a matter of necessary implication. The discovery of necessary implication by a court is most often made by characterizing the statute as
remedial. 51 And what is the effect of a characterization of a statute as remedial?
[A] remedial statute must be liberally construed, so as to effectuate
its object and purposes. Although due regard will be given the language
used, such an act will be construed, when its meaning is doubtful, so
as to suppress the mischief at which it is directed, and to advance or
the law
extend the remedy provided, and bring within the scope of
every case which comes clearly within its spirit and policy. 2
The effect of a characterization of a statute as remedial, therefore, is that it
negates the requirement of express words in order to authorize a retroactive
construction.5 3 In fact, the construction of a remedial statute requires the legislature to expressly state that only prospective operation was intended in order
to restrain the court from finding a retroactive intent. 4
A remedial statue is difficult to define since, in a sense, all statutes are
remedial in that they are enacted to remedy an existing situation. An attempted
definition of a remedial statute reads: "A remedial statute has for its object,
...the redress of some existing grievance or introduction of some regulation or
proceeding conducive to public goods." 5 5 The courts have assumed that the
term "remedial" has a limited meaning in two respects: Usually, "remedial" is
used in connection with legislation not penal or criminal in nature; and "reme5
dial" as applied to procedural statutes which do not affect substantive rights. 0
49. Id. at 160, 88 So. at 779 (Emphasis supplied.).
50. See text and cases cited at supra notes 44 & 47.
51. See generally Heimanson, Remedial Legislation, 46 Marq. L. Rev. 216 (1962).
52. Lande v. Jurisich, 59 Cal. App. 2d 613, 139 P.2d 657 (1943). See also Harrison
v. Mary Bain Estates, 2 Misc. 2d 52, 152 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964).
53. Burch v. Newbury, 1 Barb. 648, 10 N.Y. 374 (1852); Brower v. Brower, 1 Abb.
Ct. App. Dec. 214, 9 Leg. Obs. 196 (N.Y. 1851); Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 111 N.E.
837 (1916); Fetes v. Volmer, 58 Hun. 1, 11 N.Y.S. 552 (1890); Matter of Hoople, 93 App.
Div. 486, 87 N.Y.S. 842, rev'd on other grounds, 179 N.Y. 308, 72 N.E. 229 (1904); Matter
of N.Y. Express Co., 23 Hun. 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1881); People ex rel. Gabriel
v. Warden, 109 Misc. 248, 178 N.Y.S. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1919); People ex rel. Pels v. Board of
Supervisors, 63 Barb. 83, rev'd on other grounds, 65 N.Y. 300 (1875).
54. Cole v. Cole, 27 Wis. 531 (1869). See also cases cited in supra note 44.
55. Hook v. Whitlock, 2 Edw. Ch. 304, 310, aff'd, 7 Paige 373 (N.Y. 1835).

56. See J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 5704 (3d ed., Supp. 1966). See also
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An example of a remedial statute which was held procedural, as opposed to sub5
stantive, and therefore retroactive, was the New York "Long-Arm" statute. "
Examples of remedial statutes which are not penal or criminal in nature are
50
vehicle and traffic laws58 and workman's compensation acts. Divorce legislation may qualify under either or both of the above definitions of a "remedial"
statute, depending on the remedy granted by the specific act.60
61
The rules of construction for remedial statutes are many and varied. A
statute which relates to practice, procedure, or remedy is remedial and therefore retroactive, since there are no vested rights in any particular form of procedure.6 2 However, a statute, even though it be remedial, may not be retroactively applied when a "new right" is established. 6 3 It is difficult to discern
from the case law whether a disqualifying "new right" means a new right of
64
possession, that being a substantive legal right, or a mere remedy, and even
if it is a mere remedy, whether retroactive application would have the effect of
65
creating a new right of action which was forbidden in a number of cases. The
answer seems to lie in the distinction that a mere remedy means an added pro-,
cedure to enforce a pre-existing right, rather than a remedy which simultaneously creates and enforces a right. 6 Statutes providing a remedy for a pre67
and adding to the remedies
existing right where none existed previously,
Harbek v. Pupin, 123 N.Y. 115, 25 N.E. 311 (1890); Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding,
2 A.D.2d 430, 156 N.Y.S.2d 542 (4th Dep't 1956).
57. N.Y. CPLR § 302 (Supp. 1967). See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc. 15 N.Y.2d 442, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68, cert. denied sub nom., 383
U.S. 905 (1965); Rietsch v. Societe Ananyme Des Automobiles Peugeot, 45 Misc. 2d 294,
256 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Tebedo v. Nye, 45 Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d
235 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Ellis v. Newton Paper Co., 44 Misc. 2d 134, 253 N.Y.S.2d 47, rev'd on
other grounds, 24 A.D.2d 871, 264 N.Y.S.2d 414 (2d Dep't 1964); O'Connor v. Wells, 43
Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup Ct. 1964); Perlmutler v. Standard Roofing & Tinsmith Supply Co., 43 Misc. 885, 252 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
58. City of St. Louis v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1961).
59. Davis v. United Fruit Co., 120 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1960); Mlodozeniec v.
Worthington, 9 A.D.2d 21, 189 N.Y.S.2d 468 (3d Dep't 1959).
60. See cases cited in supra note 44.
61. See generally J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §§ 2201-24, 5701-04 (1943);
A. Lenhoff, On Legislation, 323-43 (1949); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights,
5 Tex. L. Rev. 231 (1927); Heimanson, Remedial Legislation, Marq. L. Rev. 216 (1962).
62. Tellier v. Edwards, 354 P.2d 925(Wash. 1960); See also Kugel v. Telsey, 250
App. Div. 638, 295 N.Y.S. 148 (2d Dep't 1937).
63. Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 111 N.E. 837 (1916); Lewittes & Sons v.
Perlow, 254 App. Div. 94, 2 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1938); Carder Realty Corp. v. State,
260 App. Div. 459, 23 N.Y.S.2d 395 (3d Dep't 1940); Wilner Friends Credit Ass'n v.
Scheffres, 175 Misc. 909, 25 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1941); Western New York & Penn.
Ry. v. City of Buffalo, 176 Misc. 350, 27 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
64. National Park Bank v. Goddard, 9 Misc. 626, 30 N.Y.S. 417 (1894), aff'd, 87
Hun. 487, 34 N.Y.S. 1144, (1895), aff'd, 156 N.Y. 657, 50 N.E. 1119 (1898).
65. Gotham Nat'l Bank of New York v. Strunsky, 162 Misc. 673, 293 N.Y.S. 961
(Sup. Ct. 1936); City of Buffalo v. New York Tel. Co., 165 Misc. 904, 1 N.Y.S.2d 842
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
66. Wilner Friends Credit Ass'n v. Scheffres, 175 Misc. 909, 25 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y.C.
Ct. 1941).
67. City of Salt Lake v. Branch, 6 F.2d 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 565
(1925); Flournoy v. State, 230 Cal. App. 2d 520, 41 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1965); Davis v. Jones,
247 Iowa 1031, 78 N.AT.2d 6 (1956) ; Opinion of the justices, 101 N.H. 515, A.2d 49 (1957);
Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 184 N.E. 735 (1933).
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already in existence, 68 are valid when applied to future

9

or past transactions. 70

3. Whether Section 170 Grants New Remedies Where None Existed Before
Can it be said that section 170 merely grants or adds new remedies for
the enforcement of existing rights? Prior to September 1, 1967, a person could
pray for separation on the same grounds now contained in section 170.71
Apparenty, his remedy was the right to legally terminate one incident of the
marital status (e.g, bed and board). There is a problem as to whether absolute divorce determines the same right, or some greater right. It would seem that
the right must be greater, since the remedy of divorce terminates not only
certain incidents of the martial status, but the status itself. But is a greater
right necessarily a new right? The question must be answered in the negative,
for the right may be greater, but not necessarily new, since it can only be
measuring in terms of remedy72 which (having run the full cycle) is a matter
of procedure.
The courts, perhaps recognizing this circuitry, have not shackled themselves with such distinctions. Rather, they have characterized divorce statutes
as remedial (without distinction) and thus entitled to liberal construction.
Such construction usually follows the pattern:
Divorce statutes concern the good order of society. If, contemplating
the interest involved as public, it is for the public order and profit that
marriage be disoluable after the transpiring of a particular delictum it
can make no difference what was the date of the delinquency, or
whether, before or after the statute was enacted. Hence, when the legislative intent does not directly appear in the statutory words, they
should be applied equally to past and future transactions.1 3
C. Influences Affecting Interpretation
A remedial statute is to be given a liberal construction, and this construction should include retroactive application. The method of construing legislation
as to retroactivity is that of intelligently balancing and discriminating be68. United States v. Willage Corp., 298 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Bowles v. Strickland,
151 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Fullerton: 87 F. Supp. 359 (D. Mass. 1949) ;
Gramner v. Roman, 174 So. 2d 443 (Fla. App. 1965); Manuel v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co.,
136 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 1961); Durocher v. Myers, 84 Mont. 225, 274 P. 1062 (1929);
Skipper-Bivens Oil Co. v. State, 115 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
T
69. See cases cited in supra notes 64, 65.
70. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1955) ; Continental Cal. Co. v. Phoenix Const.
Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956); Studstill v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 201 Ga. App.
766, 115 S.E.2d 374 (1960); Barcleen v. Howard, 299 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1959) ; Pepin v.
Beaulier, 102 N.H. 84, 151 A.2d 230 (1959); Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 488, 111 S.E.2d
422 (1959); Henry v. McKay, 164 Wash. 526, 3 P.2d 145 (1931); Leuch v. Egehoff, 260
Wis. 356, 51 N.W.2d 7 (1952).
71. N.Y. Dom. Law § 200 (Supp. 1967).
72. There are no different property rights under divorce since the doctrine of separability controls, see Note, 17 Buffalo L. Rev. - (1967).
73. 1 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 2203 (3d ed., Supp. 1966). See Smith,
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 Tex. L. Rev. 409 (1928).
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tween the reasons for and against retroactivity.7 4 Section 170, as pointed out
earlier,7" does not infer that retroactive application was intended. However, subsections 170(5), (6) do seem to indicate retroactive intent through the use of the
present perfect tense. 76 Retroactivity of these two subsections is more of a certainty in light of the New York Session Laws of 1966, chapter 254, section
15.77 In effect, section 15 allows subsections 170(5), (6) to be retroactive
one year prior to the effective date of section 170. That is, the tolling of the
two year period of separation under subsections 170(5), (6) will commence
for decrees and agreements dated September 1, 1966 or later. The implications
of section 15 could be that all of the section 170 grounds are retroactive with
only a time limitation on subsections (5) and (6). It may be, however, that the
Legislature intended to restrict retroactive treatment to the only two subsections which were clearly meant to be retroactive (according to decisions in other
states) ,78 and did not consider the other grounds to be open to retroactive
interpretation.
It might also be argued that since the statute is silent as to the retroactivity of subsections 170(1), (2), (3), the interpretation must be in favor
of retroactivity. The reason for such interpretation would be that since the
statute is remedial, the Legislature must state explicitly that retroactivity was
not intended in order to defeat such an interpretation. 79 This argument was
made and sustained in a recent unreported Supreme Court case from the Second
Judicial District of New York.80 Mr. Harry Hilton Spellman, chairman of the
special committee on matrimonial law of the New York City Bar Association,
commenting on this decision, stated: "There is absolutely no question that the
abandonment provision is retroactive." 8' Mr. Spellman, who helped draft the
new divorce law, further stated:
The statute [referring to subsection 170(2)] is purposely silent on
the time limit because abandonment is a continuing offense. Why
should a woman who is abandoned five or ten years ago be required to
count the abandonment only back to the time the law became effective? That would be grossly unfair.8 2
74. See generally Smith supra note 73.
75. See text at supra notes 34-49.
76. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 170(5) ("The husband and wife have lived separate and
apart ...."), (6) ("The husband and wife have lived separate and apart .... ") (Supp.
1967). (Emphasis supplied.)
77. See supra note 33.
78. See supra note 44.
79. See supra notes 53, 54.
80. New York Times, Nov. 8, 1967, at 49, col. 7 ("Justice Hugh S. Coyle ruled
that the abandonment provision of the state's new divorce law is retroactive, making an
offense before enactment of the law a ground for divorce."
Attorney for the plaintiff . . .Marshall S. Goldman, argued that the legislature bad
been silent on whether the offense of abandonment had to be committed after the law became
effective (Sept. 1, 1967), as would be required concerning most offenses.').
81. Id.
82. Id.
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CONCLUSION

A number of cases have recently been decided interpreting the new grounds.
A few unreported cases in Supreme Court, 8th Judicial District, did not even
question whether the new grounds were retroactive in granting divorces based
on subsections 170(1), (2) (3).83 In Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,8 4 the court
allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint for separation on the grounds of
cruelty, to add divorce on the same grounds, provided "the cause of action for
divorce . . . arises and the action based thereon is commenced subsequent to
September 1, 1967, the effective date of the new statute." 8 5 Therefore, this
court apparently felt that the statute could not be given retroactive application
since it required that the cause of action arise subsequent to the effective date
of the new legislation. In Smith v. Smith,86 the court said, in reference to new
section 210 of the Domestic Relations Law (which exempts abandonment from
the five year statute of limitations for a cause of action for divorce):
I must accept the statutory provision excepting abandonment from
the five year limitation as a binding expression of the Legislature's
view that this is a continuing offense which in effect deems each additional day a fresh violation of the marital obligations. I do not believe
that adoption of this view in the case before me confficts with the rules
of construction in regard to retroactivity of so-called remedial legislation (see Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, 82, 49 N.E. 663, 664).
Sweeping claims for retroactivity covering this new legislation have
been advanced by some writers (see Gershenson, "A Brief for Retroactivity," N.Y.L.J. 7/24/67, 7/25/67). However, there are serious
questions as to whether these claims are justified by the legislative intent as disclosed in the Joint Legislative Report or the Report of Proceedings before the Senate in the debate on April 26, 1966. I do not
therefore at this time feel that the principles and rules of law87involved
in this case should be extended beyond the facts before me.
In Packer v. Packer,88 the court found, in a default judgement, no obstacle to
retroactivity as to the abandonment provision [subsection 170(2)] stating:
"Though the statute provides no express answer to this fundamental question,
this court concludes that the plaintiff should not be required to wait another
two years before seeking relief pursuant to this statute ... [which] should be
construed as being retroactive."8 9 Much the same approach was used in Taplinger v. Taplinger,98 where the court held the new statute retroactive, stating:
"The Court will not permit the legislative intent to be thwarted for technical
83. Supreme Court, 8th Jud. Dist. has had a number of recent decisions allowing
retroactive application of N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 170(1), (2), (3), (4), Interview with
Nelson Johnson, Clerk, Special Term, 8th Jud. Dist. Nov., 1967.
84. 55 Misc. 2d 7, 284 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
85. Id. 8-9, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58. (Emphasis supplied.)
86.
87.

55 Misc. 2d 172, 284 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Id. at 173-74, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 503.

88.
89.
90.

55 Misc. 2d 74, 284 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Id. at 74, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
55 Misc. 2d 103, 284, N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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reasons. It is clear that the Legislature intended to liberalize the provisions of
the Domestic Relations Law to make the securing of a divorce decree more
easily attainable ...."91 Therefore, presumably on the basis of finding that the
new statute is, according to the language in the Smith case, "so-called remedial
legislation," 9 2 a court will implicitly construe section 170 as retroactive. As a
result of such classification, little or no attention is paid to the classical notions
of statutory construction. This has the effect of giving an appearance of judicial
law-making as opposed to discovery of the law. Recent Supreme Court decisions
in the area of civil rights and criminal procedure may lead one to suppose that
the jurisprudence technique of discovery of law is morabund. However, it is an
important part of the decision-making process that the layman be comforted
by the conservatism of the courts. The concepts of tradition and precedent also
serve to buttress the court's decisions from criticism that judges are making
law. A decision based on a "so-called theory," or based on the court's feeling
that "there is no reason why the law shouldn't be read in such and such a
way," is not in harmony with the classical views on judicial construction. The
main reason for such a liberal attitude toward the construction of the new law
is a liberal attitude toward the law itself. It was so long in coming, and the situations and results under the prior law were so unreasonable, that courts have
fettered their interpretation with the mechanics of construction. Whereas the
attitude of liberality may be justified, the need for stability and tradition in
the decisions of our courts is more important in view of the prevailing attitudes
of the public toward obedience to law and self-restraint. Thus the end may be
justified, but the means need a closer scrutiny to fulfill their role as a stabiliz93
ing force in society.
MicHAEL L. McCARTHY
91. Id. at 10, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
92. Smith v. Smith, 55 Misc. 2d at 174, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
93. See Yoli v. YoUi, 55 416, 285 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The court considers.
more carefully the problem of construction and cites the above decision accompanying supra
notes 80-92, stating: "There have been other determinations by courts which have been
'reported' unfortunately only in the daily papers. In none of these decisions has the problem
of retroactivity been brought to the fore and fully discussed. It is, I believe, essential that
we have an expression of opinion by an appellate court at the earliest possible moment."
Id. at 420, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 475. (Emphasis supplied.)

